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On Consumer Purchasing Behavior in Electronic Markets 
“The Internet is becoming the town square for the global village of tomorrow.” 
–Bill Gates 
Introduction and Overview 
Over the past several decades the Internet has led to the digitalization of many markets. Today, Electronic 
markets have taken center stage in the modern economy and become common place for consumers in a 
wide range of transactions. For example, people buy products on Amazon, hunt for bargains in auctions 
on eBay, or search for product information on Google. One key phenomenon has been the tremendous 
growth of online sales in the last decade: while in 2002 e-commerce accounted for approximately €8bn of 
revenue (Frankfurter Allgemeine 2002), it had reached €33bn or 7.7% of the total retail sales volume by 
2012, with further expansion to be expected over the coming years (IFH Köln 2013). This shift towards 
electronic markets opened up countless new opportunities for the scientific study of consumer behavior 
on an individual level. While in the past the collection of detailed consumer and transaction data in offline 
markets used to be fraught with challenges, these data have become more readily available in today's 
electronic markets, with the consequence that consumer behavior can now be analyzed in unprecedented 
detail. For instance, researchers can observe the occurrence of decision biases in real market transactions 
(Heyman et al. 2004), bidding behavior in online auctions (e.g., Roth and Ockenfels 2002), purchasing 
behavior on e-commerce websites (e.g., Brynjolfsson et al. 2011), or product search behavior on search 
engines (Agarwal et al. 2011). 
Understanding consumer behavior is of vital importance to researchers as well as companies across 
almost all types of industries. For example, Jennifer S. Nelson, global director/global strategy and 
insights, from Johnson & Johnson states that “The heart of marketing is behavior modification, and this 
will remain our focus” (Precourt 2010). Clearly, the prerequisite for such modifications is a sound 
understanding of consumer behavior. Since the 1920s, researchers from different disciplines contributed 
to this understanding (Kroeber-Riel et al. 2009) and by the mid-twentieth century, the analysis of 
consumer behavior had emerged as a distinct field of research (Robertson and Kassarjian 1991). 
Robertson and Kassarjian (1991) define the analysis of consumer behavior as “the scientific study of 
consumer actions in the marketplace”. One important subarea of this field is the analysis of different 
types of individual purchase decisions. One criterion for the classification of purchase decisions has been 
whether they are made with either a high or a low degree of cognitive control (Kroeber-Riel et al. 2009). 
A more fine-grained classification further distinguishes between (1) impulse purchases i.e., those made by 
shoppers without advance planning (Stern 1962), (2) routine purchases i.e., mundane and mostly low-risk 
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purchases based on quick decisions (Kroeber-Riel et al. 2009), (3) purchases involving limited decision 
making i.e., planned and deliberate purchases based on product experience and/or product knowledge 
(Kroeber-Riel et al. 2009), and (4) purchases involving extensive decision making, i.e. those which 
require consumers to extensively solve a problem (Howard 1977). The first two types of purchase 
decisions are associated with lower, and the latter two are with a higher degree of cognitive control 
(Weinberg 1994).  
The main goal of this dissertation is to utilize the newly available opportunities arising from the 
emergence of electronic markets to contribute to the understanding of two specific types of purchase 
decisions: impulse purchases and purchases with extensive decision making. The first, co-authored, paper, 
Herrmann, P., D. Kundisch, and M. S. Rahman (2014), is an investigation into the sunk cost effect for 
behavioral investments as a specific trigger for impulse purchases as well as the impact of delegating 
decision making to IT on the occurrence of this bias. We find that a sunk cost effect for behavioral 
investments triggers impulsive purchase decisions and, by mitigating behavioral investments, the 
delegation of decision making to IT is found to reduce the likelihood of the occurrence of this bias, and 
hence, the likelihood of impulse purchases.  
Each of the following three studies (Herrmann, P. (2014), Herrmann, P., D. Kundisch, and M. S. Rahman 
(2013), and Herrmann, P., and M. Möller (2013)) analyzes different aspects of purchasing behavior 
associated with extensive decision making. In the first paper (Herrmann, P. (2014)), I propose an 
analytical model to examine how consumers use the information contained in the variance of consumer 
ratings to make better informed purchase decisions. In this model, I consider products where the variance 
of consumer ratings can be caused by both product failure and consumer taste. The results suggest, that 
the effects of the variance of consumer ratings on consumer demand and product prices heavily depend on 
its composition i.e., the relative shares of variance caused by product failure and consumer taste. The 
second paper on purchase decisions with extensive decision making (Herrmann, P., D. Kundisch, and M. 
S. Rahman (2013)) deals with consumer bidding behavior in a specific type of online auction. Consumers 
who want to obtain a product via this online auction can adopt different bidding strategies. We investigate 
the impact of these bidding strategies on a participant’s probability of winning an auction and find that an 
aggressive bidding strategy substantially reduces a participant’s likelihood of winning an auction. In the 
third paper on purchase decisions with extensive decision making (Herrmann, P., and M. Möller (2013)), 
we analyze the product search behavior of consumers on search engines, with a particular focus on the use 
of sponsored search results in a consumer's selection of a retailer. We study the conversion of impressions 
of a sponsored search result into clicks as well as the conversion of clicks into actual purchases and how 
this conversion is affected by the ad's position on the search website. We find a significant decrease of the 
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click-through rate and cost-per-click when ads move to less prominent ad positions. However, the 
conversion rate is not affected by these moves. Interestingly, as soon as advertisers leave the top 
positions, we find a strong negative effect of the ad position on the costs per conversion which is caused 
by the combination of the lower costs-per-click on these position and the independence of ad positions 
and conversion rates. 
Together, the results of these four studies make an original contribution to knowledge by increasing the 
understanding of different facets of individual consumer purchase decisions. The results are valuable for 
consumers, marketers, and researchers alike: consumers may use the results presented in this dissertation 
to reflect on their own decisions and improve their decision making, while marketers could improve their 
marketing strategies through a better understanding of consumer behavior. Based on the findings 
presented in the first four studies they may develop strategies to better align their actions towards the 
customer and thereby influence consumer behavior more successfully. Moreover, the results from 
Herrmann, P., D. Kundisch, and M. S. Rahman (2014), Herrmann, P. (2014), Herrmann, P., D. 
Kundisch, and M. S. Rahman (2013), and Herrmann, P., and M. Möller (2013) provide valuable starting 
points for future research in the area of individual consumer purchasing behavior in electronic markets. 
This dissertation is rounded off with Kundisch, D., P. Herrmann, M. Whittaker, M. Beutner, G. Fels, J. 
Magenheim, W. Reinhardt, M. Sievers, A. Zoyke. (2012) which contributes to the area of e-learning. In 
this paper we introduce and evaluate a web-based open source solution that enables us to transfer the 
widely established Peer Instruction approach to large lecture halls. Amongst its many other applications, 
this solution has already supported the dissemination of the research results presented in this doctoral 
dissertation to our students.   
The following pages contain a short summary of the studies included in this dissertation. After each 
summary, the theoretical contributions as well as the managerial implications of each paper are presented. 
At the end of the introduction a summary table provides detailed information for each of the studies 
included in this dissertation regarding contributions of the respective co-authors to the studies and the 
scientific dissemination they gave rise to in the form of conference presentations and publications. 
Summary of Herrmann, P., D. Kundisch, and M. S. Rahman (2014) 
The first paper was a research undertaken jointly with Mohammad S. Rahman and Dennis Kundisch. This 
study investigates the impact of delegating decision making to information technology (IT) on an 
important human decision bias – the sunk cost effect. Over the past decade, the role of information 
technology has evolved from a mere decision aid to a decision making artifact. IT in this context is 
harnessed not only to support decision makers, but also to make decisions on their behalf. Examples of 
these technologies include options for involving automated agents for bidding in online auctions 
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(Adomavicius et al. 2009) or for trading in financial markets (Hendershott et al. 2011). Today, these 
agents are available at a negligible marginal cost and can effectively act on behalf of their owners. In 
2009, for instance, an astonishing 73% of all equity trading volume in the United States was executed by 
electronic agents (Mackenzie 2009). In the wake of this development a significant literature has emerged, 
analyzing the design of these software agents, their performance in real market situations, and their effect 
on market outcomes (e.g., Guo et al. 2012, Hinz et al. 2011). Yet despite the widespread usage of these 
agents, the impact of the delegation of decision making to IT on different facets of decision making, 
including decision biases, is still not well understood. Considering the economic importance of these 
decision biases (DellaVigna 2009), it is all the more critical, therefore, to analyze the effects of automated 
software agents on the occurrence of decision biases in subsequent human decision making. 
Studies of decision biases have featured in the literature for decades (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 
Pope and Schweitzer 2011), both in laboratory and field research (an overview can be found in 
DellaVigna 2009, for example). One important challenge for researchers is to provide mechanism for 
analyzing and understanding these biases, and how they can be alleviated or even avoided. Useful 
contributions to this area have been made by researchers in Information Systems. Several laboratory 
experiments have shown that decision support systems (DSS) are an effective tool for alleviating some of 
these decision biases (e.g., Bhandari et al. 2008, Lim et al. 2000, Roy and Lerch 1996). None of these 
studies, however, analyzed the potential impact of automated software agents – which effectively replace 
the human decision maker – on the occurrence of decision biases in subsequent human decisions. In 
addition, there is no evidence to date that the laboratory results associated with DSS and decision biases 
are transferable to real market situations. This is a handicap for both academics and practitioners because 
many scholars are skeptical of the transferability of lab-results to the field (e.g., List 2003). Consequently, 
we investigate whether or not IT can indeed alleviate decision bias in real market transactions. 
One common decision bias is the so-called ‘sunk cost effect’. This has been defined as the “greater 
tendency to continue an endeavor once an investment in money, effort, or time has been made” (Arkes 
and Blumer 1985). The sunk cost effect typically occurs in decision situations involving a chain of 
decisions (e.g., software projects, investments, exploration ventures, auctions) (Kanodia et al. 1989). In 
many of these situations it is now possible to delegate parts of the decision making to IT (e.g., participants 
in an online auction could delegate their bidding to an automated agent). Consequently, considering these 
two phenomena together raises the question of the impact of delegation to IT on the sunk cost effect, 
which both researchers and practitioners would benefit from better understanding. Having the good 
fortune of access to data from a real market setting we were able to seize this opportunity to investigate 
this issue both theoretically and empirically. In particular, we focus on the following research question: 
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does the delegation of decision making to IT affect the occurrence of the sunk cost effect in a subsequent 
human decision situation? 
More specifically, we theoretically establish and empirically validate the impact of IT on the occurrence 
of the sunk cost effect. We hypothesize, first, the existence of the sunk cost effect in terms of behavioral 
investments (e.g., emotional attachment, effort, and time), and second, the mitigating effect of delegating 
investment decisions to IT on behavioral investments and hence, on the likelihood of the sunk cost effect 
on subsequent human decision makings. In other words, by mitigating the contributions of different 
antecedents of behavioral investments, the delegation to IT affects the likelihood of the occurrence of the 
sunk cost effect. While there is anecdotal evidence for the link between delegating decision making to IT 
and the reduction of behavioral investments (Bapna 2003), we are not aware of any paper which 
theoretically or empirically investigates this issue, and hence, there appears to be a gap in knowledge 
concerning the in-depth understanding of the impact of behavioral investments on the sunk cost effect. 
Previous experimental studies have come up with contradictory results: some have found a positive effect 
of behavioral investments on the sunk cost effect (e.g., Cunha and Caldieraro 2009, 2010, Navarro and 
Fantino 2009); others were unable to replicate these experimental results (Otto 2010), or did not find 
evidence for the existence of the sunk cost effect for a behavioral investment, such as time (Soman 2001). 
Theoretical Contributions of Herrmann, P., D. Kundisch, and M. S. Rahman (2014) 
Our study makes several significant contributions to the literature. First, only a few studies so far analyze 
the effects of IT usage on decision biases and, more importantly, none of these considered the sunk cost 
effect. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to explore this issue. We theoretically establish 
and empirically test the hypothesis that, by reducing behavioral sunk costs, IT can alleviate the 
occurrence of the sunk cost effect and, thus, improve the quality of decisions. Second, the literature on 
decision biases and IT focuses almost exclusively on DSS which support human decision makers. 
Considering the increasing number of opportunities where decision makers can delegate their decision 
making to automated agents, it is worth investigating the impact of these new information technologies on 
decision biases. Third, the impact of IT on decision biases was hitherto analyzed only in experimental 
settings. This is the first study to test these findings in a real market setting. Fourth, the experimental 
evidence on the sunk cost effect in relation to behavioral investments is very limited, and to the best of 
our knowledge, it lacks evidence from the field. By theoretically establishing and empirically validating 
the positive effect of the delegation of decision making to IT in terms of decreasing the occurrence of the 
sunk cost effect, we provide the first field evidence for the existence of the sunk cost effect for behavioral 
investments.  
6 
 
Practical Implications of Herrmann, P., D. Kundisch, and M. S. Rahman (2014) 
The results of Herrmann, P., D. Kundisch, and M. S. Rahman (2014) are of particular interest to 
companies hosting online auctions. These firms need to carefully balance the advantage of providing 
bidding agents as a means of increasing customer satisfaction with the advantage of increased profitability 
through the sunk cost effect derived from not providing such agents. In the short term, it may increase 
profitability if bidders in classical online auctions fall prey to the sunk cost effect for behavioral 
investments and, therefore, place more and higher bids than they would otherwise have placed without 
such investments. However, in the longer term, these bidders might feel less satisfied with the auction 
website.  
Understanding the impact of delegating parts of decision making to IT on the sunk cost effect also has 
more general managerial implications. Our study shows that the sunk cost effect is induced not only by 
monetary investments but also by behavioral investments. These investments can occur in a wide range of 
situations consisting of, but not limited to, decisions about project investments, project management, 
policy making, trading on financial markets, as well as auction participations. A manager, for example, 
might invest considerable time and effort in evaluating potential project alternatives. Based on the 
theoretical mechanism described in this study, this manager would perceive the investment alternatives 
more positively compared to situations where she had not invested any behavioral resources in the 
evaluation process. If this person were to decide about investment alternatives, there may be a structural 
bias towards alternatives which require the highest evaluation effort. This bias may lead to the substantial 
misallocations of capital due to the sunk cost effect. Decision makers would therefore benefit from 
carefully assessing all types of decision situations in terms of their potential for sunken behavioral 
investments. Where substantial behavioral investments are likely to be involved, managers should realize 
that these investments may significantly affect the quality of their decision making. In these situations, 
one important question to ask is whether a decision would be different without behavioral sunk costs, in 
which case it may also be appropriate to consult a person who has not invested any behavioral resources 
or even to delegate the decision to such a person. Furthermore, in some decision situations, the 
involvement of a software agent or of another dispassionate advisor can detach decision makers from the 
decision process and, thus, protect them from behavioral investments. The resulting detachment from 
behavior investment could substantially increase the quality of decisions in various situations and, hence, 
provide decision makers with a competitive advantage. So far, however, the availability of appropriate 
software agents for decision situations remains limited. One important challenge for practitioners and 
researchers from the IS discipline would therefore be the development of automated software agents in 
order to protect decision makers from behavioral investments in a wide range of decision situations. 
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Summary of Herrmann, P. (2014) 
The second paper is a single-authored work in which I theoretically analyze the effect of the variance of 
consumer ratings on product pricing and consumer demand. Amazon.com claims that such consumer 
reviews are its most popular feature (New York Times 2004) and contributing to its current success in e-
commerce. These reviews are most commonly provided in the form of a star rating system and an 
optional text review. Amongst other things, online reviews offer a form of peer learning among 
consumers. Thereby, they transform many former experience attributes of a product into search attributes
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(Hong et al. 2012). For example, while previously it would have been impossible to evaluate the sound 
quality of a laptop without actually listening to the device, today's online consumer reviews offer a way of 
learning about certain product attributes. Not surprisingly, then, 64% of respondents in Forrester 
Research’s online survey said they want to see consumer reviews when shopping online (Kee 2008). 
Accordingly, online consumer reviews have become one of the main sources of information for online 
shoppers. Not all experience attributes, however, can be turned into observational search attributes. For 
example, a perusal of the negative textual consumer reviews for a Cordless Kettle
2 
shows that the most 
common complaint concerned the failure of the automatic shut-off, a fault that developed even after a 
relatively short period of usage. From these reviews, consumers can learn that the failure of the automatic 
shut-off presents a common problem for this kettle. What they cannot infer from these reviews, however, 
is the exact likelihood of their individual product developing this fault. 
Much of the information contained in the textual consumer reviews is summarized in the star rating 
ranging from one (lowest recommendation) to five (highest recommendation) on most e-commerce 
websites. A bar chart shows the distribution of the awarded consumer ratings with the average rating 
prominently displayed beneath the product name. Consumers can see how much other consumers liked a 
product on average and whether all consumers liked the product to the same degree or whether their 
opinions differed widely by considering the first two moments of this distribution: the average and the 
variance. Not surprisingly, a significant literature has emerged, analyzing the effects of these different 
aspects of the distribution of consumer reviews on consumer demand. While several studies find that the 
absolute number and the average of consumer ratings positively affect consumer demand, we know of 
only few studies which explicitly analyze the effect of the variance of online consumer ratings on demand 
(e.g., Clemons et al. 2006, Sun 2012) and none of these studies explicitly analyze this effect depending on 
whether the variance is caused mainly by observational search (i.e., the sound quality in our example) or 
by experience attributes (i.e., failure of the water kettle). 
                                                          
1 Hong et al. (2012) provide an excellent review of the literature on search and experience attributes. 
2 http://www.amazon.com/Aroma-AWK-115S-X-Press-2-Liter-Cordless/product-reviews/B000KDVTJI/ 
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The effect of the variance of consumer ratings on product price and demand may depend heavily on 
whether it is caused mainly by an observational search or by an experience attribute: by considering 
variance caused by observational search attributes, consumers can build on the experience of other 
consumers and learn how well a product fits their individual preferences and criteria (Sun 2012). In 
contrast, while variance caused by experience attributes provides some information about these attributes, 
consumers ultimately have to rely on their own experiences for a final evaluation. Thus, this paper 
considers products where two product attributes may jointly cause the variance of consumer ratings: an 
observational search and an experience attribute, and whether these different sources of variance 
differently affect product price and consumer demand. In particular, the paper answers the following 
research question: how does the variance of consumer ratings affect product price and demand if this 
variance is caused by observational search and experience attributes? 
To determine the effect of the different sources of variance of product ratings on product price and 
consumer demand, I construct an analytical model featuring one monopoly retailer, risk averse consumers 
and a product where consumer disagreement can be caused by both an observational search attribute i.e., 
an attribute where consumers can learn from the experiences of others, and an experience attribute i.e., 
one where consumers cannot learn from other consumers' experiences.  
The model is analyzed for three types of products: pure observational search products where the variance 
of consumer ratings is solely caused by the observational search attribute; pure experience products where 
the variance of consumer ratings is solely caused by the experience attribute; and observational search 
and experience products where the variance of consumer ratings is caused by the observational search and 
the experience attribute.  
Theoretical Contribution of Herrmann, P. (2014) 
The analysis yields the following main results: first, a higher variance caused by the observational search 
attribute always signals that a product is much liked by some consumers but disliked by others. This 
results in a higher equilibrium price and lower equilibrium demand. Second, a higher variance caused by 
the experience attribute signals that there is some risk associated with buying the product resulting in a 
lower equilibrium price and demand. Third, holding the average rating as well as the total variance of 
ratings constant and increasing the relative share of variance caused by the observational search attribute 
reveals an increase in both the equilibrium price and the demand for products with low total variance. Via 
this mechanism, equilibrium price and demand can increase with increasing total variance of product 
ratings depending on the composition of the variance of consumer ratings. In other words, this paper 
demonstrates how risk-averse consumers may prefer a more expensive product with a higher variance of 
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ratings when deciding between two similar products with the same average rating. These results suggest 
that the effects of the variance of consumer ratings on consumer demand and product prices heavily 
depend on its composition i.e., the relative shares of variance caused by observational search and by 
experience attributes. For researchers, this composition may be an important additional variable when 
empirically analyzing the effects of consumer ratings. Furthermore, the analytical model presented in this 
paper provides a theoretical foundation for the empirically observed j-shaped distribution (Hu et al. 2007, 
Hu et al. 2009) of consumer ratings in electronic commerce. This result could serve as the basis for future 
analyses of these ratings.  
Practical Implications of Herrmann, P. (2014) 
The findings presented in this paper have important managerial implications: first, retailers could consider 
the composition of the variance to improve their sales forecast and, thereby, increase their profits by 
adjusting their stocks accordingly. Second, they could implement mechanisms to explicitly communicate 
information about the composition of the variance to enable more customers to consider this important 
information in their decision making. By providing this information, retailers could further reduce 
information asymmetries in electronic commerce. Moreover, they could charge higher prices for those 
products where a larger relative share of the variance of product ratings is caused by observational search 
attributes. Today, consumers can only indirectly infer this information by analyzing specific 
characteristics of the rating distribution, i.e., a peak in 1-star ratings or by reading through the textual 
consumer reviews for a specific product. As a first step to making this information directly available, 
retailers may consider providing additional information about the percentage of the most negative 
consumer ratings caused by product failure. To collect this information a retailer could ask each consumer 
who is posting a negative consumer rating whether it is based on product failure or on other factors such 
as personal preferences. 
Summary of Herrmann, P., D. Kundisch, and M. S. Rahman (2013) 
The third paper is a joint study with Mohammad S. Rahman and Dennis Kundisch, in which we 
investigate the impact of aggressive bidding on the likelihood of winning an online auction. Today, such 
online auctions have become a mainstream economic phenomenon, with the total value of goods sold on 
eBay having reached approximately $70 billion in 2011. It is hardly surprising, then, that for over a 
decade online auctions have featured prominently as a research topic in the IS literature (e.g., Bapna et al. 
2001, Bockstedt and Goh 2012) as well as in the economics literature (e.g., Malmendier and Lee 2011). 
The analysis of different types of bidding strategies in these auctions features prominently in this 
literature (e.g., Bapna et al. 2004, Bapna et al. 2009, Kauffman and Wood 2005).  
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Important components of bidding strategies are bidders’ decisions about when to reveal information about 
their own valuation of the auctioned good. Many bidders are inclined not to reveal their intentions for as 
long as possible, whereas others intentionally reveal information about their own valuation of the product 
early on in the bidding process. The first type of bidding strategy is customarily referred to as sniping 
(e.g., Roth and Ockenfels 2002), in which the bidder waits for the last moment of an auction to submit her 
bid. In contrast, we refer to the second strategy, when bidders intentionally submit a (high) bid early on in 
the bidding process, as aggressive bidding.  
While there is theoretical (Ockenfels and Roth 2006), experimental (Ariely et al. 2005), and field 
experimental (Ely and Hossain 2009) evidence that sniping is an optimal response to naïve bidding, the 
theoretical literature on aggressive bidding suggests at least two competing theoretical explanations for 
this bidding strategy: signaling and impatience. More importantly, these differing theoretical explanations 
each offer their own predictions about the effects of aggressive bidding. According to the signaling 
explanation, the deliberate revealing of information early on in the process is used by bidders to signal 
their valuation, which is presumed to be high, in an attempt to intimidate competitors; this strategy is seen 
as increasing their chances of winning an auction (e.g., Avery 1998). The impatience explanation, in 
contrast, suggests that the early revelation of information is attributable to the attempt to speed up an 
auction (Isaac et al. 2007) and has no effect on a bidder’s winning probability. The empirical evidence on 
this issue is inconclusive. While some empirical studies conclude that the main driver for aggressive 
bidding is bidder impatience (e.g., Isaac et al. 2005), there is anecdotal as well as limited evidence from 
one field experiment that this bidding strategy is able to deter at least part of the competition (e.g., Ely 
and Hossain 2009).  
To this date, we do not know of any empirical study which rigorously evaluates the effect of an 
aggressive bidding strategy in an attempt to intimidate one’s opponents in an (online) auction. For 
example, the understanding of how the aggressive bidding strategy compares with other bidding strategies 
is still lacking. The gap in the literature may be explained by the difficulty involved in isolating those 
bidding situations where bidders submit aggressive bids to signal a high valuation in an attempt to 
intimidate their opponents. Online pay-per-bid auctions (e.g., beezid.com, bidcactus.com) – which 
constitute a variant of ascending price auctions – allow us to address this important challenge. In this 
specific auction format we can rule out impatience as a reason for aggressive bidding and, thus, we are the 
first to provide an empirical answer to the following research question: what effect does an aggressive 
bidding strategy in an attempt to intimidate one’s opponents have on a bidder’s chances of winning an 
auction?  
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Theoretical Contributions of Herrmann, P., D. Kundisch, and M. S. Rahman (2013) 
By analyzing aggressive bidding in a pay-per-bid auction context, we are the first to empirically evaluate 
the signaling value of aggressive bidding and to provide an empirical answer to the question of whether 
revealing information early on in an online auction context does pay off for the bidder. In the light of the 
competing theoretical explanations for the existence of aggressive bidding, the different predictions 
linked to these explanations, and the lack of empirical evidence on the signaling value of aggressively 
placed bids, our research offers valuable new insights of interest to both information systems research and 
to behavioral economics research. 
Practical Implications of Herrmann, P., D. Kundisch, and M. S. Rahman (2013) 
The results presented in this study have important implications for bidders, particularly in pay-per-bid 
auctions, and more generally for bidders in ascending price auctions. Our findings suggest that bidders in 
pay-per-bid auctions perform substantially worse if they use aggressive bidding as a strategy to 
discourage competitors. Given the vast amount of aggressively placed bids, aggressive bidders could, 
ceteris paribus, substantially increase their chances of winning an auction by adopting a very different 
bidding strategy. Transferring this to a typical ascending price auction, our results suggest that, apart from 
speeding up the auction and thereby incurring fewer costs associated with the bidding process, adopting 
an aggressive bidding strategy not only brings no added benefit but may even have a potentially negative 
effect. 
Summary of Herrmann, P., and M. Möller (2013) 
The fourth paper, Herrmann, P., and M. Möller (2013), is joint work with Michael Möller and based on 
his master's dissertation which was carried out under my supervision. In this research, we analyze the 
product search behavior of consumers on search engines, with a particular focus on the use of sponsored 
search results in a consumer's selection of a retailer. We study the conversion of impressions of a 
sponsored search result into clicks as well as the conversion of clicks into actual purchases and how this 
conversion is affected by the ad's position on the search website. On most search engines, ads are sold via 
an auction mechanism for specific search keywords. For each keyword, advertisers place bids based on 
their maximum willingness to pay for a click by a consumer on an ad for a specified keyword. After an 
auction, the search engine operator ranks the bidders by their willingness to pay, combined with their ads 
past click performance. Subsequently, the search engine operator makes a decision about the positioning 
of the ad on the search website based on this ranking. Typically, there are up to three slots for sponsored 
search results above and up to eight slots on the right hand side of the organic search results, with the top 
positions invariably the most costly. But do these top positions offer the best value for the advertiser?  
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While several studies find that click-through rates (number of clicks divided by the number of 
impressions of a specific keyword) decrease for less prominent ad positions (Brooks, 2004; Ghose and 
Yang, 2009; Agarwal et al., 2011, Animesh et al., 2011), there is an ongoing discussion as to which ad 
position leads to the highest conversion of clicks to actual purchases (Brooks, 2004; Chakravarti et al., 
2006; Ghose and Yang, 2009; Agarwal et al., 2011). In particular, experimental results of Chakravarti et 
al. (2006) suggest that prescreening information is irrelevant in subsequent search behavior, which in turn 
suggests that conversion-rates (conversions divided by clicks on a specific keyword) should be 
independent of the ad position whereas Ghose and Yang (2009) and Brooks (2004) find a significant 
negative relationship between less prominent ad positions and conversion-rates. Contrasting with these 
results, Agarwal et al. (2011) find a positive relationship between less prominent ad positions and 
conversion-rates. Brooks (2004) reports the same relationship for unpopular keywords with low search 
volumes.  
With this paper we want to add to this literature. In particular, we answer the following research question: 
How does the ad position of a sponsored search result affect its click-through-rate, conversion-rate, and 
cost-per-conversion? We answer our research question by analyzing a unique and very rich dataset 
provided by a big German online marketing agency for several customer projects on Google AdWords, as 
well as by conducting a field experiment where we display a group randomly selected keywords from one 
of these customers on less prominent ad positions and compare their performance to a control group 
which is displayed on more prominent positions. Our dataset contains detailed click and transaction data 
for the ads for 7,048 keywords from 5 different companies over a 5 month period. The field experiment 
was conducted for 198 keywords over an eight week period. The results of our analyses are as follows: In 
our empirical study, we find a significant negative correlation between an ad’s position, its click-through-
rate, and its cost-per-click and no significant negative correlation between an ad’s position and its 
conversion-rate. As ad-positions are negatively correlated with costs-per-click and uncorrelated or even 
positively correlated with conversion-rates, costs-per-conversion are also negatively correlated with ad-
position.  In particular, we find a decrease in the costs-per-conversion of approximately 40% if ads are not 
listed at the top position but, for example, on the less prominent position four. Validating these results, 
our field experiment shows a significant and substantial negative relationship between ad-position and 
click-through-rates, cost-per-click, and costs-per-conversion and no significant relationship between ad 
position and conversion-rates.  
Theoretical Contributions of Herrmann, P., and M. Möller (2013) 
Our paper contributes to the existing literature for several reasons: First, our study provides additional 
empirical and field experimental evidence for the negative effect of an ad’s position on click-through-
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rates and costs-per-click. By introducing a new dataset consisting of more than 500,000 observations for 
German retailers from five different categories, our work contributes to the internationalization as well as 
to the generalization of the previous research on the effects of ad-positioning on key performance 
indicators in search-engine-advertising. Moreover, our field experiment addresses potential endogeneity 
concerns regarding the relationship between keywords’ ad positions, click-through-rates, costs-per-click, 
and conversion-rates. Second, there is no consensus about the effect of ad positioning on conversion-
rates. With our research, we provide empirical and (field-) experimental evidence that conversion-rates 
are not negatively and most often even unrelated with ad-positions. Third, recent studies have been able to 
show that advertisers can substantially increase their profits by not bidding for the top positions for their 
keywords (Skiera and Abou Nabout, 2013). By empirically and experimentally showing that costs-per-
conversion decrease with less prominent ad-positions, our paper provides additional evidence for the 
potential higher profitability of these ad-positions.  
Practical Implications of Herrmann, P., and M. Möller (2013) 
The findings of our paper might have important managerial implications. Currently, advertisers are 
engaged in intense bidding wars for the top position in sponsored search results (Agarwal et al., 2011). 
Our findings emphasize that this strategy might be based on an incorrect assumption about the 
relationship between ad positions and costs-per-conversion. If an advertiser’s main target is to generate a 
maximal number of conversions with a given daily budget and the daily budget is typically depleted at 
some point in time, or the monetary and non-monetary value of a conversion is lower than the cost-per-
conversion on the most prominent ad position, she may generate a substantially higher value by not 
participating in these bidding wars. While conversion-rates do not decrease with increasing ad-positions, 
costs-per-click strongly decrease if advertisers do not compete for the top positions. Combining these two 
effects leads to diminishing costs-per-conversion for less prominent ad positions. In particular, we show 
that advertisers can reduce their cost-per-conversion by around 40% if they decide not to bid for the top 
ad position but, for example, target position four. Still, if an advertiser’s main target is to generate as 
many clicks or conversions as possible, bidding for the top position in sponsored search results might be 
the best strategy. Higher click-through-rates and constant (or only slightly increasing) conversion-rates at 
the top positions promise the highest total number of clicks and conversions on these positions.  
Summary of Kundisch, D., P. Herrmann, M. Whittaker, M. Beutner, G. Fels, J. Magenheim, W. 
Reinhardt, M. Sievers, A. Zoyke. (2012) 
The fifth paper, Kundisch, D., P. Herrmann, M. Whittaker, M. Beutner, G. Fels, J. Magenheim, W. 
Reinhardt, M. Sievers, A. Zoyke. (2012), is a collaboration with Dennis Kundisch, Michael Whittaker, 
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Marc Beutner, Gregor Fels, Johannes Magenheim, Wolfgang Reinhardt, Michael Sievers, and Andrea 
Zoyke, and originated as part of the PINGO project (www.upb.de/pingo).
3
 In this paper, we introduce a 
web-based open source solution that enables the transfer of the widely established Peer Instruction 
approach to lectures with in excess of 350 participants. The study was motivated by the widely 
documented fact that undergraduate and graduate students often lack in-depth understanding of key 
concepts in all sorts of subject areas, and research has highlighted the limited role played by traditional 
lecture-style courses in facilitating this understanding (e.g., Beichner et al. 2000, Crouch et al. 2007). On 
the other hand, the literature has well established that students develop complex reasoning skills most 
effectively when they actively participate in the subject matter (e.g., Crouch et al. 2001, DeCorte 1996, 
Hake 1998). Active participation vitalizes and supports the students’ learning process much better than 
the traditional lecture style. One way to foster such participation in the lecture hall is to integrate 
cooperative activities among students using Classroom Response Systems (CRS). A CRS is any system 
used in a face-to-face setting to poll students and gather immediate feedback in response to questions 
posed by instructors. CRS have been tested and used in higher education classrooms since the 1960’s 
(Judson and Sawada 2002), and its benefits documented in different meta-analyses (Fies and Marshall 
2006, Roschelle et al. 2004). Over the past decades, technologists have developed and refined electronic 
CRS that allow students to key in responses using so-called “clickers”. The main advantages of electronic 
CRS over non-technical methods for gathering feedback are, amongst others, the possibility they offer to 
anonymize the responses (Draper and Brown 2004) and for the instant projection of response graphs for 
the whole class to see. In addition, Stowell and Nelson (2007) find that classroom participation is higher 
when electronic CRS are used compared to conventional CRS. Thus, instructors are mostly relying on 
electronic CRS as instructional tools in the classroom today (e.g., Cleary 2008).  
One specific usage for CRS is that it can assist Peer Instruction (PI) (Mazur 1997), a cooperative teaching 
and learning approach that is well-suited for involving students even in large auditoriums. Technically 
similar to the ask-the-audience lifeline in “Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?”, the students get involved in 
the lecture by using clickers to answer multiple-choice questions posed by the instructor. The questions 
are designed to engage students and to instantly reveal potential comprehension difficulties. If the 
questions are not answered correctly, course participants are encouraged to discuss their answers with 
their peers or the lecturer may decide to present the same subject matter differently. The benefits of PI 
have been established in many empirical studies using different methods across different disciplines (see, 
e.g., Crouch and Mazur 2001, Crouch et al. 2007, Fies and Marshall 2006). However, PI has so far rarely 
been used in very large groups, i.e., groups of (well) above 350 students. One major reason for the 
                                                          
3 Within the PINGO project, the author of this thesis contributed to the following further publications: Magenheim et al. 2012, 
Sievers et al. 2012, Reinhardt et al. 2012, Kundisch et al. 2013a, Kundisch et al. 2013b. 
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comparably slow dissemination of PI is the high cost of electronic CRS infrastructure, primarily the cost 
of physical clickers and/or software licensing fees. Moreover, in interviews conducted by the authors, 
instructors have mentioned the complexity of software solutions and the need for installation as further 
important technological barriers to the use of PI.  
Given the widespread proliferation of smartphones, laptops, netbooks, and other web-enabled end-user 
devices among students, having recourse to web technology would appear to be a promising way to avoid 
the cumbersome and costly infrastructure investments normally required for PI. A review of existing PI 
solutions indicates that the CRS market has recently developed in this direction, but important hurdles 
remain if a more widespread adoption of PI is to be achieved. In order to help create a technically and 
didactically favorable environment for the transfer of PI to large audiences, we initiated the PINGO (Peer 
Instruction for very large Groups) project. The goal of this project is to develop a scalable, web-based, 
cost-efficient and user-friendly PI application for students and instructors. Hence, we introduce and 
evaluate a prototype of our web-based solution (referred to as the PINGO system) in this paper. We report 
results from the evaluation of the PINGO system using the Technology Acceptance Model, the System 
Usability Scale as well as qualitative interviews.  
Theoretical Contribution of Kundisch, D., P. Herrmann, M. Whittaker, M. Beutner, G. Fels, J. 
Magenheim, W. Reinhardt, M. Sievers, A. Zoyke. (2012) and of the PINGO Project 
In general, providing the PINGO system to researchers from all around the world provides several 
opportunities to evaluate the impact of CRS based teaching/learning methods. In particular, the PINGO 
system enables researchers to evaluate the effectiveness of PI as well as of other CRS-based 
teaching/learning methods in large groups. Furthermore, researchers can analyze how different 
configurations of these teaching methods, as well as different designs of the system affect student 
learning. Finally, PINGO facilitates the evaluation of the effectiveness of different question types 
integrated in CRS-based teaching/learning methods in large lectures. 
Practical Implications of Kundisch, D., P. Herrmann, M. Whittaker, M. Beutner, G. Fels, J. 
Magenheim, W. Reinhardt, M. Sievers, A. Zoyke. (2012) and of the PINGO Project 
Having provided the PINGO system for free has created substantial feedback from teachers around the 
world. Today, more than 1,300 lecturers from around 250 universities are registered users of the PINGO 
system. These users created approximately 14,000 surveys and collected more than 220,000 votes.
4
 Thus, 
the PINGO system is broadly used to implement CRS-based teaching/learning methods around the world. 
                                                          
4 Latest usage statistics can be found under pingo.upb.de/stats. 
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By presenting the PINGO System on numerous occasions, we hope to further facilitate the dissemination 
of CRS-based teaching/learning methods. 
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Abstract 
We investigate the impact of delegating decision making to information technology (IT) on an important 
human decision bias – the sunk cost effect. To address our research question, we use a unique dataset 
containing actual market transaction data for approximately 7,000 pay-per-bid auctions. In contrast with 
the laboratory experiments of previous related studies, our research presents the unique advantage of 
investigating the effects of IT-enabled automated bidding agents on the occurrence of a decision bias in 
real market transactions. We identify normatively irrational decision scenarios and analyze consumer 
behavior in these situations. Our findings show that participants with a higher behavioral investment are 
more likely to violate the assumption of normative economic rationality due to the sunk cost effect. More 
importantly, we observe that the delegation of auction participation, i.e., actual bidding, to IT significantly 
reduces the occurrence of the sunk cost effect in subsequent decisions made by the same individual. We 
can attribute this reduction to the comparably lower behavioral investments incurred by auction 
participants who delegate their bidding to IT. In particular, by mitigating different contributors of 
behavioral investments, delegating to IT reduces the likelihood of the occurrence of the sunk cost effect 
by more than 50%.  
 
Wir untersuchen den Einfluss der Delegierung von Entscheidungen an Informationstechnologie (in 
unserem Fall automatische Biet-Agenten) auf eine wichtige kognitive Verzerrung im 
Entscheidungsverhalten: den Sunk-Cost-Effekt. Um diesen Einfluss zu untersuchen, nutzen wir einen 
Datensatz mit Transaktionsdaten aus ungefähr 7.000 Pay-per-Bid-Auktionen. Im Gegensatz  zu früheren 
experimentellen Studien können wir so den Effekt von automatischen Biet-Agenten auf eine 
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Entscheidungsverzerrung in einer realen Marktsituation beobachten. Im Rahmen unserer Studie 
identifizieren wir Entscheidungssituationen, die irrationale Entscheidungsalternativen beinhalten und 
analysieren das Entscheidungsverhalten in diesen Situationen. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass 
Auktionsteilnehmer mit höheren Verhaltensinvestitionen durch den Sunk-Cost-Effekt eine höhere 
Wahrscheinlichkeit aufweisen die Annahme der normativen ökonomischen Rationalität zu verletzen. Wir 
beobachten außerdem, dass die Delegierung der tatsächlichen Auktionsteilnahme an einen Biet-Agenten 
das Auftreten des Sunk Cost Effekts in nachfolgenden Entscheidungen des gleichen Individuums 
verringert. Diesen Effekt können wir den geringeren Verhaltensinvestitionen von Individuen, die die 
Auktionsteilnahme an einen Biet-Agenten delegieren, zuschreiben. In Zahlen verringert diese 
Delegierung durch die Abschwächung unterschiedlicher Quellen von Verhaltensinvestitionen die 
Wahrscheinlichkeit des Auftretens des Sunk-Cost-Effekts um über 50%.  
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Abstract 
It is well known that consumer ratings play a major role in the purchase decisions of online shoppers. To 
examine the effect of the variance of these ratings on future product pricing and sales we propose an 
analytical model which considers products where the variance of consumer ratings results from two types 
of product attributes: observational search attributes and experience attributes. We find that if a higher 
variance is caused by an observational search attribute it results in a higher equilibrium price and lower 
equilibrium demand, whereas if it is caused by an experience attribute the result is a lower equilibrium 
price and demand. Interestingly, when the average rating as well as the total variance of ratings are held 
constant and the relative share of variance caused by the observational search attribute is increased, we 
observe a rise in both the equilibrium price and the demand for products with low total variance. Via this 
mechanism, and depending on the composition of the variance of consumer ratings, it is possible for the 
equilibrium price and demand to increase with increasing total variance of product ratings. In other words 
we are able to demonstrate that, when faced with a choice between two similar products with the same 
average rating, risk-averse consumers may prefer a more expensive product with a higher variance of 
ratings. Moreover, our analytical model provides a theoretical foundation for the empirically observed j-
shaped distribution of consumer ratings in electronic commerce. 
 
Es ist bekannt, dass Kundenbewertungen eine wichtige Rolle im Kaufentscheidungsprozess von Online-
Käufern spielen. Um den Effekt der Varianz von diesen Kundenbewertungen auf zukünftige 
Produktpreise und -Verkäufe zu analysieren, schlagen wir ein analytisches Modell vor, in dem diese 
Varianz von zwei Arten von Produktcharakteristika verursacht werden kann: Beobachtungs-Such-
Attribute und Erfahrungsattribute. Wir zeigen, dass höhere Varianz, die durch ein Beobachtungs-Such-
Attribut ausgelöst wird, zu einem höheren Gleichgewichtspreis und zu geringerer 
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Gleichgewichtsnachfrage führt, wohingegen höhere Varianz, die durch ein Erfahrungsattribut verursacht 
wird, zu einem niedrigeren Preis und niedrigerer Nachfrage führt. Interessanterweise zeigt sich, dass 
wenn man die Gesamtvarianz der Kundenbewertungen und den Bewertungsdurchschnitt konstant hält und 
der relative Anteil der Varianz, die durch ein  Beobachtungs-Such-Attribut verursacht ansteigt, dies zu 
einem Anstieg des Gleichgewichtspreises und der Gleichgewichtsnachfrage für Produkte mit geringer 
Gesamtvarianz führt. Durch diesen Mechanismus und abhängig von der Gesamtkomposition der Varianz 
kann es sein, dass die Gleichgewichtsnachfrage und der Gleichgewichtspreis mit steigender Varianz 
ansteigen. Es ist also möglich, dass risikoaverse Konsumenten ein Produkt mit höherer Varianz und 
höherem Preis bevorzugen, wenn sie zwischen zwei ansonsten gleichen Produkten entscheiden müssen. 
Weiterhin liefert unser analytisches Modell eine theoretische Fundierung der empirisch sehr häufig 
beobachteten J-Form der Verteilung von Kundenbewertungen im Online-Handel. 
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Abstract 
We analyze aggressive bidding, used as a strategy to intimidate auction competitors, with regards to its 
impact on the likelihood of winning an online auction. To answer our research question, we use a dataset 
containing actual market transaction records for approximately 7,000 online pay-per-bid auctions. Our 
research design allows us to isolate aggressive bids that are used in an attempt to deter other auction 
participants by signaling a high valuation. Thus, we can analyze the effects of this strategy on the 
probability of winning an auction. We find a significant negative effect of aggressive bidding on one’s 
likelihood of winning an auction. Our results suggest that aggressive bidding is not successful in deterring 
auction competitors. When comparing the effectiveness of different strategies, we find sniping to be up to 
seven times more effective than aggressive bidding. 
 
In dieser Arbeit untersuchen wir den Effekt einer aggressiven Bietstrategie, mit dem Ziel andere 
(potentielle) Auktionsteilnehmer von der weiteren Auktionsteilnahme abzuschrecken, auf die 
Wahrscheinlichkeit eine Auktion zu gewinnen. Um diese Frage zu beantworten, nutzen wir einen 
Datensatz mit Transaktionsdaten aus ungefähr 7.000 Pay-per-Bid-Auktionen. Der Aufbau unserer Studie 
ermöglicht es uns aggressive Gebote, die mit dem Ziel andere Auktionsteilnehmer durch die frühzeitige 
Signalisierung einer hohen Zahlungsbereitschaft abzuschrecken abgegeben wurden, zu isolieren. So 
können wir den Effekt dieser Gebote auf die Wahrscheinlichkeit eine Auktion zu gewinnen untersuchen. 
Die Ergebnisse unserer Analysen zeigen einen signifikant negativen Effekt einer aggressiven Bietstrategie 
auf die Wahrscheinlichkeit eine Auktion zu gewinnen und legen damit nahe, dass eine solche Strategie 
22 
 
nicht erfolgversprechend ist. Verglichen mit einer abwartenden Bietstrategie zeigt sich das eine 
aggressive Bietstrategie bis zu siebenmal weniger effektiv ist. 
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Abstract  
Search Engine Advertising is one of the fastest growing instruments in online marketing and a major 
source of costs for online advertisers. In this research, we empirically and experimentally investigate the 
impact of ad positioning on key performance indicators in search engine advertising namely click-
through-rates, cost-per-click, conversion-rates, and cost-per-conversion. We answer our research question 
by using a unique and very rich dataset provided by an online marketing agency as well as by conducting 
a field experiment on a major web search engine. Our analysis of the provided dataset shows that click-
through-rates and cost-per-click are negatively correlated with the ad position i.e., the topmost ad position 
has higher click-through-rates and cost-per-click than, for example, positions two and three. In contrast, 
we do not find a significant negative correlation, and in the majority of cases no correlation, between ad 
positions and conversion-rates. Thus, due to the high cost-per-click for the top ad positions and the non-
existent negative correlation between ad positions and conversion-rates, lower ad positions are also 
correlated with lower costs-per-conversion compared to the top positions. In particular, we find a decrease 
in the costs-per-conversion of approximately 40% if ads are not listed at the top position but, for example, 
on the less prominent position four. Validating these results, our field experiment shows a significant and 
substantial negative relationship between ad-position and click-through-rates, cost-per-click, and costs-
per-conversion and no significant relationship between ad position and conversion-rates.  
 
Bezahlte Suchmaschinenwerbung ist eines der am schnellsten wachsenden Instrumente im Online-
Marketing und ein wichtiger Kostentreiber für Online-Werbetreibende. In dieser Arbeit untersuchen wir 
empirisch und experimentell, wie sich die Positionierung eine bezahlte Suchmaschinenanzeige auf 
unterschiedliche Key-Performance-Indikatoren in der Suchmaschinenwerbung, namentlich Klickraten, 
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Konversionsraten und Kosten-pro-Konversion, auswirkt. Wir untersuchen diesen Zusammenhang anhand 
eines einzigartigen und sehr detaillierten, von einer Online-Werbeagentur bereitgestellten Datensatzes 
und anhand eines Feldexperiments für bezahlte Suchmaschinenwerbung bei einer großen Suchmaschine. 
Unsere Analysen des bereitgestellten Datensatzes zeigen, dass Klickraten und Kosten-pro-Klick negativ 
mit der Anzeigenposition korreliert sind, also die prominenteste Platzierung höhere Klickraten und 
Kosten-pro-Klick aufweist als zum Beispiel die Positionen zwei und drei. Im Gegensatz dazu finden wir 
keine negativen Korrelation und in den meisten Fällen gar keine Korrelation zwischen der 
Anzeigenposition und der Konversionsrate. Die Kombination aus der negativen Korrelation zwischen 
Anzeigenposition, Klickraten und Kosten-pro-Klick und der nicht vorhandenen negativen Korrelation 
zwischen Anzeigenposition und Konversionsrate ergibt auch eine negative Korrelation zwischen der 
Anzeigenposition und den Kosten-pro-Konversion. In Zahlen finden wir ungefähr 40% niedrigere 
Kosten-pro-Konversion wenn eine Anzeige nicht auf der prominentesten Position sondern auf der 
weniger prominenten Position vier angezeigt wird. Diese Ergebnisse bestätigend finden wir im Rahmen 
unseres Feldexperiments einen ökonomisch und statistisch signifikant negativen Zusammenhang 
zwischen der Anzeigenposition und den Klickraten, Kosten-pro-Klick und Kosten-pro-Konversion und 
keinen signifikanten Zusammenhang zwischen Anzeigenpositionen und Konversionsraten. 
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Abstract 
In this research, we introduce a web-based open source solution that enables the transfer of the widely 
established Peer Instruction approach to lectures with in excess of 350 participants. The proposed solution 
avoids several existing technical flaws that currently hinder the further adoption of Peer Instruction. We 
test our solution in a series of lectures with over 500 participants. Within these tests, we evaluate our 
prototype using the Technology Acceptance Model, the System Usability Scale, as well as qualitative 
interviews. Both the evaluation results and the feedback from course participants indicate that our new 
solution is a useful artifact for implementing Peer Instruction in lectures with very large groups. 
 
In dieser Arbeit wird ein Web-basiertes Open-Source-Software-Artefakt vorgestellt, welches die 
Übertragung des etablierten Peer Instruction-Ansatzes in große Vorlesungen mit mehr als 350 Teilnehmern 
ermöglicht. Die vorgestellte Lösung vermeidet unterschiedliche existierende technische Schwierigkeiten, 
die aktuell die weitere Verbreitung des Peer Instruction-Ansatzes verhindern. Wir testen unser Artefakt in 
einer Serie von Vorlesungen mit über 500 Teilnehmern und evaluieren unser Artefakt im Rahmen dieser 
Tests mit dem Technology Acceptance Model, der System Usability Scale und qualitativen Interviews. 
Sowohl die Evaluationsergebnisse als auch das qualitative Feedback von Vorlesungsteilnehmern zeigen, 
dass unser Software-Artefakt geeignet ist Peer Instruction auch in sehr großen Gruppen zu implementieren. 
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